Africa File, July 11, 2024: Sahelian Juntas vs. ECOWAS; US Base in Côte d’Ivoire
Creator: Liam Karr
Information Cutoff: July 11, 2024, at 10 a.m.
The Africa File supplies common evaluation and assessments of main developments concerning state and nonstate actors’ actions in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and pursuits.
Editor’s Be aware: The Essential Threats Venture on the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with assist from the Institute for the Research of Struggle.
Key Takeaways:
West Africa. The central Sahelian juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger established a confederation that deepens their break with West Africa’s ECOWAS and goals to strengthen their home and regional credibility. This break up from the primary West Africa political and financial bloc, the Financial Group of West African States (ECOWAS), would undermine ECOWAS’s legitimacy by hampering regional financial and safety integration and democratic improvement.
The brand new confederation expands the operational scope of the juntas’ alliance and can possible create extra alternatives for the juntas to proceed coordinating diplomatic efforts and solidifying ties with like-minded non-Western companions. The confederation may search so as to add new members, which might additional strengthen its energy and legitimacy in its place regional bloc. The deteriorating safety in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger poses the most important risk to the respective regimes and broader confederation.
Côte d’Ivoire. French media reported that the Ivorian authorities permitted the development of a US base in northwestern Côte d’Ivoire, as america withdraws and relocates from Niger. The reported base may have some sensible vary limitations for US intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance drones in comparison with the earlier base in northern Niger. The brand new base dangers fomenting a preferred anti-Western backlash towards the Ivorian authorities and america.
Assessments:
West Africa
The central Sahelian juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger established a confederation that deepens their break with ECOWAS and goals to strengthen their home and regional credibility. Malian junta chief Assimi Goita, Burkinabe chief Ibrahim Traore, and Nigerien chief Abdirahmane Tchiani signed 4 paperwork that established the Confederation of Sahel States (CES), or Confédération des États du Sahel, following their first joint convention.[1] The three leaders held their assembly on July 6, a day earlier than ECOWAS held its personal scheduled convention.[2] The three nations had already been working collectively beneath the identify Alliance of Sahel States (Alliance des États du Sahel, AES) since September 2023.[3]
The CES expands the operational scope of the AES from a mutual protection settlement to a physique that coordinates quite a lot of insurance policies. The juntas initially fashioned the AES in September 2023 as a mutual self-defense pact to discourage a threatened ECOWAS army intervention to forcibly depose the nascent Nigerien junta.[4] The CES is a multi-sectoral alliance that coordinates diplomatic, financial, and army coverage among the many three member states. It additionally provides new supporting establishments akin to a rotating presidency and parliament to implement these aims.[5] Cupboard-level officers had mentioned and beneficial lots of the initiatives and adjustments throughout lower-level summits in current months.[6] Malian press stated that the brand new confederation would have “no elementary distinction” from ECOWAS.[7]
The member nations agreed to arrange a unified safety drive and create a joint plan for army actions.[8] These agreements are a continuation of discussions from March, when the AES introduced preliminary plans to extend joint counterinsurgency operations.[9] The AES states have repeatedly criticized ECOWAS for its inaction on regional safety points.[10] The AES has solely carried out one such operation since March, when Burkinabe and Nigerien troopers performed joint patrols over per week in early June to safe a phase of the N3 street in northern Burkina Faso.[11] The AES has continued coordinating drone strikes throughout the borders of its member states’ territories, which have been commonplace because the inception of the AES.
Determine 1. AES Joint Operations
Supply: Liam Karr; Armed Battle Location and Occasion Information Venture.
The confederation additionally plans to extend financial cooperation to combine its member states’ economies and reduce reliance on exterior companions. The CES goals to facilitate the free motion of individuals, items, and providers inside the AES space.[12] The AES leaders additionally stated they needed to “pool their sources” in strategic sectors akin to agriculture, water, vitality, and transport.[13] The juntas additionally plan to create an funding financial institution and stabilization fund.[14] The AES international affairs ministers beneficial many of those initiatives throughout a summit in November 2023.[15] The AES didn’t define any plans for growing a shared forex, though they’ve repeatedly signaled this as a precedence in earlier conferences and statements.[16]
The AES leaders body the confederation as a part of their wrestle for sovereignty and a direct problem to ECOWAS. The juntas have every based mostly their legitimacy and in style assist on pro-sovereigntist narratives since they took energy.[17] Their narratives are centered on a supposed need for extra equal and transactional partnerships.[18] This push is an express rejection of the earlier decade of Western assist, which drew criticisms that Western insurance policies have been too paternalistic and concerned too many strings and preconditions.[19] Western governments usually predicated their help on democratic governance, which frequently failed to achieve a excessive diploma of native legitimacy, and Western-approved counterinsurgency campaigns, which native militaries considered as mushy and ineffective.[20]
The juntas have branded ECOWAS an enemy of their sovereignty resulting from ECOWAS’s efforts to punish the coup regimes and implement a return to constitutional rule. ECOWAS sanctioned every nation for a number of months after their coups and demanded plans for all nations to return to constitutional order.[21] ECOWAS responded particularly strongly to the Nigerien coup in July 2023, threatening to depose the Nigerien junta and levying harsh sanctions for over six months that severely harmed the Nigerien financial system.[22]
The sanctions contributed to the juntas asserting their rapid withdrawal from ECOWAS in January 2024, which they reiterated following the July 6 summit. The juntas blamed their resolution on ECOWAS turning into a “international”-dominated physique that was finishing up the bidding of the displaced Western powers.[23] The AES doubled down on this rationale by framing the CES as “far faraway from the stranglehold of international powers” and a part of an “irrevocable and rapid” withdrawal from ECOWAS.[24] The juntas explicitly rejected the availability within the ECOWAS treaty that mandates a one-year withdrawal discover interval throughout which the withdrawing events are nonetheless accountable for their ECOWAS commitments.[25]
ECOWAS continues to be looking for to reconcile with the junta leaders, nonetheless. ECOWAS has stated that it’s dissatisfied with its lack of progress in returning the AES nations and would make extra “vigorous” steps following the July 7 ECOWAS summit.[26] ECOWAS tasked the Senegalese and Togolese presidents to barter with the juntas as a part of these efforts.[27] Each presidents have maintained ties with the juntas, and Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye stated in late Might that reconciliation was doable when he toured all three nations.[28] The ECOWAS leaders additionally permitted plans to mobilize a 5,000-strong regional standby counterterrorism drive, which is a response to AES grievances over the ineffectiveness of ECOWAS safety responses.[29]
Determine 2. CES vs. ECOWAS International locations in West Africa
Supply: Liam Karr.
The AES member states’ withdrawal from ECOWAS would undermine ECOWAS’s legitimacy by hampering regional financial and safety integration and additional insulating the juntas from having to return to democratic rule. Their withdrawal would get rid of free commerce and visa-free dwelling and work provisions between ECOWAS and AES nations.[30] This is able to considerably hurt expansive cross-border economies.[31] The elimination of free commerce provisions would additionally doubtlessly result in tariff limitations and different transaction prices. This is able to disproportionately have an effect on AES nations’ economies, since they’re import dependent and landlocked.[32]
The withdrawal would complicate financial integration, akin to a shared forex. The AES didn’t withdraw from the West African Financial and Financial Union that presently binds the AES nations and ECOWAS members Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Togo to the franc of the Monetary Group of Africa (CFA franc).[33] Nevertheless, the AES and ECOWAS have every mentioned completely different plans to exchange the CFA franc with a regional forex, which dangers creating two completely different regional currencies.[34]
The withdrawal would additionally undermine efforts to fight regional insecurity. Their withdrawal would take away the three nations on the coronary heart of the Sahelian Salafi-jihadi insurgency from any regional counterterrorism drive, limiting ECOWAS to do something however try and comprise the spillover. It will additionally undermine preexisting coordination mechanisms, particularly in intelligence sharing, and result in separate bilateral agreements on intelligence sharing with particular person nations.[35] The financial impression of the withdrawal on cross-border economies may even disproportionately have an effect on already-marginalized border communities that Salafi-jihadi teams prey on.[36]
The withdrawal would take away instruments that ECOWAS has to facilitate transitions to constitutional democratic rule within the AES nations, undermining ECOWAS’s efforts to defend democracy in West Africa.[37] All three states have repeatedly proven their lack of curiosity in such transitions by delaying elections and cracking down on civil society opposition and media of their nations.[38] Nevertheless, ECOWAS was in a position to conform to a tentative transition plan with Guinea to carry elections by the top of 2024, exhibiting that such instruments may be helpful.[39] ECOWAS additionally faces self-inflicted criticism as a legit defender of democracy resulting from many ECOWAS leaders manipulating their state constitutions and elections to extend their holds on energy.[40]
The brand new confederation will possible create extra alternatives for the juntas to proceed coordinating diplomatic efforts and strengthening ties with like-minded non-Western companions. All three AES regimes have already been broadly coordinating their diplomatic exercise by expelling numerous American, French, and UN companion forces and safety help in favor of nearer cooperation with various “honest companions” since taking energy, akin to China, Iran, Russia, and Turkey.[41] The junta leaders reaffirmed the necessity to proceed talking with “one voice” in the course of the summit.[42] The creation of a rotating CES presidency and parliament will assist advance this aim. Mali had already immediately facilitated cooperation between Russia and the remainder of the AES by both internet hosting conferences between Russian and Burkinabe and Nigerien officers or serving as a base space for Russian officers to journey to the neighboring AES nations.[43]
Russia has been the first safety guarantor of the AES and has used these ties to broaden cooperation in nonmilitary sectors. Russia has practically 2,000 troopers which might be a part of the Ministry of Protection–managed Wagner Group and Africa Corps in Mali, roughly 200 Africa Corps troopers in Burkina Faso, and no less than one other 100 Africa Corps troopers in Niger.[44] The forces in Mali take part in offensive operations, whereas the Burkinabe and Nigerien contingents are primarily coaching native forces and defending the junta heads.[45] Quite a few Russian non-public and state-owned corporations have signed a number of agreements and memorandums of understanding on civil nuclear cooperation, military-technical cooperation, pure useful resource mining, gold refinery development, and telecommunications with the AES states since September 2023.
Determine 3. Vital Cooperation Between Russia and the AES
Supply: Liam Karr.
China has been a number one financial companion for the AES states resulting from China’s willingness to work with the juntas to proceed increasing its preexisting investments in Mali and Niger specifically.[46] Chinese language state-owned corporations have invested in crude oil, uranium, and solar energy tasks throughout the AES.[47] The Nigerien junta additionally signed an settlement in March with a Chinese language state-owned firm to obtain a $400 million advance on its share of future oil gross sales by way of the brand new Chinese language-built pipeline in Niger.[48]
Turkey has been a number one safety companion for the AES. All three nations depend on Turkish drones and have shut private contacts within the Turkish protection business.[49] Turkish-funded Syrian mercenaries additionally started working in no less than Niger and doubtlessly Burkina Faso in 2024 to guard essential financial websites the place the Turkish authorities has a shared stake, akin to mines.[50] The UK-based human rights watchdog Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) first reported in January 2024 that Turkish-trained and supervised Syrian mercenaries from the SADAT Worldwide Protection Consultancy deployed to Burkina Faso and Niger.[51] SOHR claimed in Might that 1,100 mercenaries had deployed to Niger since September 2023.[52] CTP can’t affirm this declare. There was no proof to substantiate SOHR’s preliminary claims till Might 2024, which signifies that the mercenaries usually are not current on this scale or are unusually discrete. Turkish state media has additionally traditionally accused SOHR of being anti-Turkish.[53]
Iran has proven curiosity in turning into an financial and protection companion to the AES since 2023. Iranian officers met with their AES counterparts a number of instances all through 2023. The Iranian regime and affiliated media shops have repeatedly emphasised financial points as an space of focus in Iran-AES relations.[54] Iran has signed a number of agreements on vitality, mining, and different sectors with Burkina Faso and Niger in 2023 and 2024 and protection offers with Mali and Burkina Faso in 2023.[55] Nevertheless, CTP can’t confirm if the events have applied any of those plans, and follow-through has beforehand been a problem for Iranian engagement in Africa.[56] French and US media have additionally reported on features of negotiations for a uranium-for-arms deal between Iran and Niger.[57]
The AES may search so as to add new members, which might additional strengthen its energy and legitimacy in its place regional bloc. Article 11 of the unique AES constitution permits “another State sharing the identical geographical, political and socio-cultural realities” of the founding nations to hitch the alliance if all present members approve.[58]
The Chadian regime could search to hitch the AES to strengthen its inner regime safety. Malian officers claimed that Chad’s now-elected junta mentioned becoming a member of the bloc when a Chadian delegation visited all three AES leaders in April.[59] The identical supply stated that Malian chief Assimi Goita was enthusiastic concerning the dialogue.[60] Russia has additionally made vital efforts to develop ties with Sudan in 2024. Russian President Vladimir Putin invited Chadian President Mahamat Deby to Moscow in January 2024, and Russian International Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Chad in June 2024.[61] CTP beforehand famous that aligning with the AES and Russia would assist Deby handle inner strain to distance himself from France and bolster his regime’s stability.[62] Chad would additionally profit from higher cooperation with the AES resulting from its shared border with Niger and preexisting cooperation with the Nigerien army to fight the varied Salafi-jihadi teams working within the Lake Chad Basin.[63]
The Sudanese authorities, backed by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), may search to hitch the AES because it fights for its survival within the Sudanese civil warfare. Senior SAF leaders visited Mali and Niger on June 4 for the primary time because the Sudanese civil warfare started.[64] The SAF delegation mentioned “positions to be held in regional and worldwide organizations” and different bilateral cooperation with each nations throughout their conferences.[65] Russia has additionally sought to strengthen its ties to the SAF in 2024 because it pursues a Crimson Sea naval base in Port Sudan. The 2 nations have been negotiating an arms-for-base deal since April.[66] Working extra carefully with the AES and Russia would create extra avenues for the SAF to achieve extra army assist and allies in numerous worldwide boards. Higher coordination with the AES would additionally create alternatives for the SAF to strain Chad on its position as a rear assist base for the rival Fast Assist Forces that the SAF is combating in Sudan, both immediately or by way of AES interlocutors.[67]
Guinea additionally may be a part of the AES and renege on its deliberate democratic transition on the finish of 2024. The Guinean junta has proven sympathy for the AES juntas and brought more and more authoritarian measures, regardless of declining to hitch the bloc so far and adhering to the ECOWAS transition plan.[68] The agreed transition timeline to carry elections by the top of 2024 creates a pure resolution level for the Guinean junta if it needs to stay in energy. Russia has maintained a strong working relationship with the Guinean junta resulting from its investments in Guinean bauxite mining.[69]
The deteriorating safety in all three AES nations poses the most important risk to the respective regimes and broader confederation. The regional al Qaeda and Islamic State associates have strengthened because the juntas took energy. Insurgents are progressively encircling numerous government-controlled cities, together with nationwide capitals; spreading to new areas; and conducting deadlier and extra subtle assaults.[70]
Determine 4. Salafi-Jihadi Space of Operations within the Sahel
Be aware: “JNIM” is Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen. “ISSP” is Islamic State Sahel Province.
Supply: Liam Karr; Armed Battle Location and Occasion Information Venture.
This trajectory threatens the legitimacy of the juntas, who got here to energy promising to handle insecurity with their new methods and companions.[71] Rising insecurity is at odds with this promise and creates a credibility and legitimacy deficit for the juntas. Rising discontent amongst troopers has led to a number of coup scares since September 2023.[72] French media reported that Mali and Russia even despatched troopers to guard Traore amid the newest scare in June 2024, highlighting the preexisting regime safety features of the AES.[73]
Russia could face related in style criticisms that companion nations beforehand leveled on the West resulting from its seen position if it fails to assist the regimes resolve the insurgencies or increase their financial improvement.[74] CTP has already assessed that Russian safety help is primarily geared at regime safety and won’t handle the broader insecurity many African companions are dealing with.[75] Russia additionally can’t considerably improve improvement or army funding in Africa resulting from its financial constraints, which its invasion of Ukraine has compounded by including extra home calls for.[76]
Côte d’Ivoire
French outlet Le Monde reported that the Ivorian authorities permitted the development of a US base in northwestern Côte d’Ivoire, as america withdraws and relocates from Niger. Le Monde stated that its sources couldn’t affirm any particulars concerning the base past its location close to the city of Odienne.
US forces are presently withdrawing from Niger and will probably be in another country by September 2024. The Nigerien junta annulled its protection agreements with america in March, following a breakdown in relations after tense conferences with US officers over Niger’s rising ties with Russia and Iran.[77] US troopers accomplished their withdrawal from Niamey Air Base on July 7 and can depart their second base in northern Niger by September 15.[78] The US constructed the $110 million drone base in northern Niger in 2019 for its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance actions to assist counterterrorism operations towards the West African al Qaeda and IS associates.[79] US Africa Command Commander Gen. Michael Langley warned that the lack of US basing within the Sahel would “degrade our capability to do energetic watching and warning, together with for homeland protection.”[80]
The USA has been discussing establishing new bases with Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana as options to Niger since no less than January 2024.[81] This shift aligns with different US nonmilitary efforts that intention to comprise the Sahelian Salafi-jihadi insurgency from spilling over and consuming the littoral states, such because the 2019 International Fragility Act.[82] The brand new base can be positioned properly to assist bilateral and regional coordination efforts, akin to ECOWAS’s proposed counterterrorism drive.[83] Langley met with high civilian and army leaders, together with presidents and protection chiefs, in Côte d’Ivoire in late April and introduced that the US Africa Command can be investing $65 million in Côte d’Ivoire in 2024.[84]
The reported base in Côte d’Ivoire may have some sensible vary drawbacks in comparison with the bottom in northern Niger. American forces in Niger use MQ9 Reaper drones, which have a 1,150-mile vary.[85] A lot of the Sahelian-based Salafi-jihadi areas of operations are inside this vary from Odienne. Nevertheless, Odienne is farther from the epicenter of the insurgency close to the Burkinabe, Malian, and Nigerien tri-border space, which is able to add transit time to drone rotations. Russia has additionally provided no less than Niger with antiair techniques that may shoot down US drones if they don’t safe overflight permission.[86] Odienne can be crucially out of vary of the Lake Chad Basin, limiting the sources out there to observe IS’s West Africa Province, which hosts the regional IS administrative workplace. Newer variants of the MQ9B “SkyGuardian” Reaper have unspecified prolonged ranges that might assist mitigate a few of these points.[87]
Determine 5. The Present and Potential Vary of United States Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Drone Capabilities in West Africa
Supply: Liam Karr.
Be aware: US forces will withdraw from Agadez Air Base by September 15. Le Mondereported on July 9 that the US had agreed to construct a brand new base in Odienne, Côte d’Ivoire, however stated it’s unclear when the bottom can be operational.
The creation of the brand new base may foment in style anti-Western backlash towards the Ivorian authorities and america. Anti-Western sentiment, particularly anti-French sentiment, is salient throughout Francophone West Africa, together with in Côte d’Ivoire.[88] France is actively drawing down its presence in Côte d’Ivoire in response to those considerations.[89]
Opposition teams have strongly criticized Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara for being too pro-West and having questionable democratic credentials. Detractors have labeled Ouattara a Western puppet resulting from his sturdy relationships with France and the West that date again to when he entered the presidency in 2010 and proceed to the current.[90]
France and the UN militarily supported pro-Ouattara rebels in northern Côte d’Ivoire within the Second Ivorian Civil Struggle who have been combating towards the earlier president after he refused to go away workplace following an election loss to Ouattara.[91] Opposition teams have additionally boycotted the latest presidential elections, which Ouattara gained in 2020 after he exploited a authorized loophole to run for a constitutionally unlawful third time period.[92] Ouattara’s celebration is planning to assist him for a fourth time period in October 2025, when he will probably be 83.[93]
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[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/west-africas-ecowas-decries-lack-progress-with-junta-states-2024-07-08
[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-niger-burkina-faso-sign-sahel-security-pact-2023-09-16
[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-niger-burkina-faso-sign-sahel-security-pact-2023-09-16
[5] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240706-sommet-de-l-aes-nos-peuples-ont-irrpercentC3percentA9vocablement-tournpercentC3percentA9-le-dos-%C3percentA0-la-cpercentC3percentA9dpercentC3percentA9ao; https://www.actuniger dot com/politique/20241-confederation-des-etats-du-sahel-le-mali-designe-pour-assurer-en-premier-la-presidence-tournante-adoption-de-la-declaration-de-niamey.html
[6] https://bamada dot internet/alliance-des-etats-du-sahel-aes-les-ministres-des-affaires-etrangeres-du-mali-niger-et-burkina-faso-proposent-la-creation-dune-confederation; https://burkina24 dot com/2023/11/25/vers-la-creation-dune-compagnie-aerienne-commune-aux-etats-de-lalliance-des-etats-du-sahel-aes
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[9] https://westafricareport dot com/2024/03/07/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-the-creation-of-aes-joint-anti-jihadist-force; https://www.lemonde.fr/en/worldwide/article/2024/07/06/niger-s-military-leader-states-niger-mali-burkina-irrevocably-turned-backs-on-ecowas_6676875_4.html
[10] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/worldwide/article/2024/07/06/niger-s-military-leader-states-niger-mali-burkina-irrevocably-turned-backs-on-ecowas_6676875_4.html; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/07/06/le-burkina-faso-le-mali-et-le-niger-s-unissent-au-sein-d-une-confederation-des-etats-du-sahel_6247402_3212.html; https://pscc.fes.de/fileadmin/user_upload/photographs/publications/2024/FES-PSCC-NoteAnalyse02-A4-EN-LowRes.pdf
[11] Armed Battle Location and Occasion Information Venture database, out there at https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool
[12] https://www.actuniger dot com/politique/20241-confederation-des-etats-du-sahel-le-mali-designe-pour-assurer-en-premier-la-presidence-tournante-adoption-de-la-declaration-de-niamey.html
[13] https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/07/06/le-burkina-faso-le-mali-et-le-niger-s-unissent-au-sein-d-une-confederation-des-etats-du-sahel_6247402_3212.html
[14] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240706-sommet-de-l-aes-nos-peuples-ont-irrpercentC3percentA9vocablement-tournpercentC3percentA9-le-dos-%C3percentA0-la-cpercentC3percentA9dpercentC3percentA9ao
[15] https://bamada dot internet/alliance-des-etats-du-sahel-aes-les-ministres-des-affaires-etrangeres-du-mali-niger-et-burkina-faso-proposent-la-creation-dune-confederation
[16] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1529937/economie-entreprises/lalliance-des-etats-du-sahel-peut-elle-vraiment-creer-sa-propre-monnaie; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1524779/economie-entreprises/mali-burkina-niger-une-monnaie-commune-est-elle-credible
[17] https://www.bbc.com/information/articles/cp38v5p6g35o; https://www.lemonde.fr/en/worldwide/article/2024/07/06/niger-s-military-leader-states-niger-mali-burkina-irrevocably-turned-backs-on-ecowas_6676875_4.html; https://www.actuniger dot com/politique/20241-confederation-des-etats-du-sahel-le-mali-designe-pour-assurer-en-premier-la-presidence-tournante-adoption-de-la-declaration-de-niamey.html
[18] https://www.clingendael.org/publication/sahels-new-geopolitics
[19] https://www.clingendael.org/publication/sahels-new-geopolitics
[20] https://www.clingendael.org/publication/sahels-new-geopolitics
[21] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/junta-led-sahel-states-rule-out-return-west-african-economic-bloc-2024-07-06; https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240225-%F0percent9Fpercent94percentB4-west-african-bloc-ecowas-lifts-its-economic-sanctions-against-guinea-statement; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/west-african-ecowas-bloc-mulls-new-strategy-towards-junta-states-2024-02-24; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/africa/ecowas-lifts-sanctions-on-niger-burkina-faso-mali/3146935
[22] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/ecowas-nigeria-and-niger-coup-sanctions-time-recalibrate; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-cuts-2023-budget-by-40-post-coup-sanctions-bite-2023-10-07; https://www.worldbank.org/en/nation/niger/overview; https://africacenter.org/highlight/niger-coup-reversing-hard-earned-gains
[23] https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20240129-afrique-de-l-ouest-pourquoi-mali-niger-et-burkina-faso-divorcent-ils-de-la-cpercentC3percentA9dpercentC3percentA9ao; https://www.aljazeera.com/information/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas; https://globalvoices.org/2024/02/27/local-reactions-to-the-withdrawal-of-burkina-faso-mali-and-niger-from-ecowas
[24] https://www.actuniger.com/politique/20241-confederation-des-etats-du-sahel-le-mali-designe-pour-assurer-en-premier-la-presidence-tournante-adoption-de-la-declaration-de-niamey.html
[25] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-says-it-will-not-respect-ecowas-treatys-withdrawal-notice-period-2024-02-07; https://issafrica.org/iss-today/proposed-ecowas-exits-leave-west-africa-at-a-crossroads; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/es/doc/EPRS_BRI(2024)762295
[26] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/west-africas-ecowas-decries-lack-progress-with-junta-states-2024-07-08
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