- Introduction
- Similarities between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso
- Presence of France and the US
- Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger’s personal initiatives
- Russia instead for international help to rising governments
- Threats of Russian presence to the West
- Conclusions
This doc is a replica of the unique revealed by the Spanish Institute for Strategic Research on the following hyperlink.
Introduction
Since 2020, six coups d’état have taken place in West Africa. Two in Mali (2020, 2021), two in Burkina Faso (2022, 2022), one in Niger (2023) and one in Guinea (2021). The panorama of notable instability is accompanied by a robust army presence within the area.
Corruption, financial mismanagement, the rampant rise of jihadism and the lack of the regional governments to cope with introduced challenges are a few of the elements which have inspired political and social tensions which were mirrored within the talked about coups d’état.
The international locations of the Liptako-Gourma area (Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger) have been extra proactive than Guinea. They’ve taken their very own initiative and determined to unite in coalition to resolve the precarious scenario in Western Africa, abandoning established relations and alliances to create new ones which can be the topic of research on this paper.
Similarities between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso
These three international locations share rather more than a border. First, they share a colonial previous marked by the French presence. All three have been a part of Afrique Occidentale Française, skilled its affect of tradition and administration, and gained independence in the identical 12 months, 1960. To today the connection of those international locations with France remains to be fairly robust, each politically and economically. The clearest instance of that is the usage of the CFA franc1 because the nationwide forex in all three international locations. A forex linked to the euro, which is basically managed by France and has been described as a type of financial colonialism2 by some economists3.
Secondly, the three international locations take pleasure in nice cultural variety inside their borders, the place communities of various ethnicities, religions and languages coexist. Nonetheless, inside this variety there’s a predominant Muslim affect, whose origins lie within the arrival of the Tuaregs within the twelfth century and which remains to be current at this time with a sure radicalization by terrorist teams.
Third, these international locations share comparable financial difficulties. Excessive poverty charges, poorly diversified economies and a excessive dependence on agriculture or uncooked supplies. Their economies, as a consequence of the colonial interval, are extra targeted on the exploitation and export of uncooked supplies than on manufacturing. For instance, Niger is very depending on the exploitation and export of uranium, gold or oil mines.
Fourthly, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso undergo from nice political instability. Steady adjustments in energy, coups d’état, widespread corruption and lack of unity with neighboring international locations within the struggle towards shared issues are the results of the failure of the established political programs. In Mali, Colonel Assimi Goïta has led two coups d’état within the final 4 years. The primary in August 2020 and the second in Could 2021. In Burkina Faso, there have additionally been two coups d’état, the primary in January 2022 and eight months later the second in October 2022, which introduced Captain Traoré to energy. In Niger, the final coup d’état befell on July 26, 2023, with the Nigerian military overthrowing President Mohamed Bazoum.
These coups have had a number of penalties in financial issues and relations with neighboring international locations and powers current within the space. The Financial Group of West African States (ECOWAS), of which the three international locations are members, has utilized varied sanctions, interrupting diplomatic and commerce relations with them, and the African Union (AU) has suspended the three states from the group.
Lastly, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger share an enormous regional safety downside, attributable to the excessive presence of terrorist teams, particularly Islamists. This has a direct and oblique damaging affect on the opposite elements talked about above.
The start of this improve in terrorism, which was exploited by jihadist teams to increase their presence in neighboring international locations and take over the area, might be traced again to the 2012 Tuareg rebellion4 in Mali. Since then, West African international locations have witnessed a devastating conflict between authorities forces and armed Islamist teams, together with these affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State within the Higher Sahara. In Determine 2 we are able to see the exponential improve of Islamist teams, akin to AIQM (Al-Qaeda within the Islamic Maghreb) or ISGS (Islamic State within the Higher Sahara), within the Liptako- Gourma area from 2014 to 2023.
The objective of those terrorist teams has been to regulate provide routes and improve their areas of affect by sieges, kidnappings, landmines or improvised explosive gadgets (IEDs) as ways of warfare. However the extra excessive these teams turn out to be and the extra the safety scenario in these international locations worsens, the extra the army campaigns of the ruling juntas harden. A working example is Burkina Faso5, which has developed a method of whole conflict towards jihadists, recruiting and organizing tens of hundreds of civilians into self-defense militias.
This case interprets right into a notable improve in armed conflicts within the space, as we are able to see in Determine 3, the place we are able to see that Burkina Faso is the nation the place terrorist exercise is most current, particularly on the Sahelian aspect of Al-Qaheda, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).
This improve in violence and armed conflicts worsens the residing circumstances of the inhabitants, will increase rigidity, alters the political order and hinders financial exercise. If we add to this the ineffective response of the elected governments, the consequence is that insecurity and regional violence are the primary reason for the sequence of coups d’état and destabilization within the three international locations analyzed.
Presence of France and the US
This instability and rising insecurity in Western Africa has additionally affected the exterior actors current within the territory. France and the US had been, till now, the powers with the best presence within the space. Both for political causes, akin to slowing down the enlargement of the united states through the Chilly Battle (1947-1991), or for financial incentives, such because the uranium and oil reserves in Niger.
Because the second half of the twentieth century, France has been thought of the “gendarme of Africa” and Europe’s most important consultant on the continent. It has maintained shut relations with its former African colonies and has carried out dozens of army interventions to keep up its affect within the area, guarantee entry to strategic markets and pure assets, shield allied regimes and stop the rise of governments that might go towards its pursuits. A sort of relationship that has given the area of African international locations with a French presence the identify of Franc-Africa6.
The latest and related operations are associated to the rising insecurity within the area. Of specific notice is Operation Serval7 which started in January 2013 desiring to curb the advance of Islamist teams following the 2012 Tuareg rise up in Mali. In July 2014 it was changed by Operation Barkhane8. Different European powers additionally confirmed curiosity in intervening by the Takuba Activity Force9, built-in into Operation Barkhane.
Nonetheless, within the absence of enhancements within the scenario, protests by the Malian inhabitants elevated. This issue, coupled with the 2 coups d’état in 2020 and 2021, the poor relations of the French authorities with the brand new junta and the entry on the scene of the Wagner group, led to the withdrawal of French troops from Mali in 2022.10 This case was later repeated in Burkina Faso and Niger with their very own coups d’état.
These coups have symbolized a revolution for the folks of those international locations, a chance to regain sovereignty and put an finish to French affect and privileged entry to the political elite and pure assets. Not less than that’s the opinion of a few of the African people11, who again their assist for the army juntas within the transitional interval, arguing that their function is momentary and they’ll ultimately hand over energy to a extra ready civilian authorities.
Then again, the US, which not like France didn’t have colonies in Africa, elevated its presence on this continent through the Chilly Battle in an try and curb the enlargement of the united states’s affect. Since then, Washington’s most important goal in Africa has been to include jihadism, particularly in North Africa and the Sahel due to the rising risk of terrorist teams akin to Boko Haram or Al-Qaeda.
In 2007, the US centralized its army actions on the continent by a Unified Combatant Command underneath the identify of AFRICOM. Nonetheless, after the failure and unfavorable public opinion created by the Iraq conflict (2003) and the dying of US Ambassador Chris Stevens within the Benghazi assault in 2012, the US modified its safety coverage within the area and diminished its army commitments. Furthermore, this worldwide exercise was additional diminished underneath the Trump administration.
At present, the US safety technique is targeted on the Indo-Pacific, the place its most important rival, China, is positioned. As well as, public opinion’s refusal to behave militarily exterior its borders has led the US to intervene solely in conflicts the place it has very clear and robust pursuits. In comparison with the remainder of the world, the U.S. army presence in Africa is negligible.
As might be seen within the map in Determine 4, the exterior presence of the U.S. serves primarily as assist to allied states and as a prevention or deterrence measure towards doable threats or conflicts on the planet.
Within the face of the coups d’état in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, the US has maintained a agency place defending the reinstatement of constitutional order and its assist for ECOWAS, as a elementary physique for the transition processes, and for the international locations of the area that keep and defend democratic rules. Proof of the latter are the diplomatic trips12 of the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas- Greenfield, to Liberia, Guinea Bissau and Sierra Leone. The place she reaffirmed the US dedication to the struggle towards corruption, disinformation and the protection of freedom of the press. But this was not the one go to of the US authorities to the African continent. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has been on a tour of West Africa, highlighting the alarming function of the Russian presence in regional conflicts13 and pledging $45 million to spice up coastal safety and almost $150 million in humanitarian help for Western Africa and the Sahel14.
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger’s personal initiatives
Confronted with rising distrust in regards to the capability of exterior actors, akin to France or the US, to deal with safety issues in West Africa, African states have come collectively on a number of events to hunt their very own resolution and struggle a typical downside collectively.
In 2014, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mali, Mauritania and Niger created an alliance to fight regional insecurity by cooperation and coordination, underneath the identify Sahel G5. Nonetheless, the alliance was born with a number of root issues. First, the creation of a power out of pre-existing nationwide armies that carry their very own structural and operational challenges. Secondly, its restricted funding, as its members are among the many poorest and least developed international locations within the world15. Because of this the alliance lacks the means to attain its targets. Lastly, the vastness of the territory lined by the area exceeds the capability of the army power at their disposal.
Furthermore, the alliance has not managed to keep up a agency independence from exterior help from the West. The G5 Sahel has been supported by the EU with the missions EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUTM Mali16, and has collaborated with France by Operation Barkhane.
Consequently, the G5 Sahel has not labored as anticipated and within the face of the rising scenario of insecurity, instability and mistrust of Western powers, Mali was the primary nation to depart the alliance in 2022 and a 12 months later, in 2023, Burkina Faso and Niger followed17.
Subsequently, on September 16, 2023, the army juntas of those three international locations determined to create their very own initiative by signing the Liptako-Gourma Constitution. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES). A pact by which they commit themselves to intervene, together with by way of power, in favor of the members if considered one of them is attacked by an exterior energy, in an effort to re-establish and assure the regional and nationwide safety of every of them. However the aspirations of this alliance have gone past that. Along with protection, the signatory boards intend to take it into the political and financial realm, as they demonstrated in November 2023 after holding a summit with the ministers of Economic system, Business and Trade18.
These strikes on the a part of the alliance prompted some alarm inside ECOWAS, as they additional marked the distancing of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from the financial neighborhood. Consequently, a primary assembly between an ECOWAS delegation and the Niamey junta was convened for January 10, 2024, however was postponed till January 25, 2024, to barter the lifting of sanctions and the transition durations from army juntas to democratic governments. Nonetheless, of the 5 members of the ECOWAS fee anticipated in Niamey, just one confirmed up19, one thing which was not nicely accepted by Niger’s army junta and consequently by its allies.
On January 28, 2024, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso introduced in a televised look and with out prior nationwide session their exit from ECOWAS, giving as most important causes: the illegitimacy of the sanctions imposed, the betrayal of the founding rules of the alliance, the management of exterior powers and the failure within the struggle towards regional insecurity of the alliance. Ought to this resolution materialize, it might have multidimensional penalties.
Though this isn’t the primary time {that a} member of the alliance has determined to depart (Mauritania did so in 200020), the scenario and circumstances of ECOWAS then and now are very totally different. Its cohesion and solidity will not be the identical because it was in 2000, and the departure of 1 member isn’t the identical because the departure of three. The implications on this case might put the regional group in a sophisticated scenario. The top of the free motion of individuals and items, the breakdown of the free commerce settlement or the return of commerce obstacles are a few of the penalties that might hurt financial progress, migratory flows and meals safety. As well as, ECOWAS would lose its function as a mediator in negotiations on democratic transitions with the army juntas, it could lose about 8% of its GDP21 and the response to terrorism could be much more divided.
Nonetheless, the method of exiting ECOWAS is lengthy and formal steps haven’t been taken but.22 The televised announcement by the army boards of the AES has no legitimacy. They need to make a proper notification and, in the event that they achieve this, they need to proceed to adjust to the obligations of membership till their exit is legally formalized.
This entire course of diverts consideration away from democratic transitions and redirects public debate, thus benefiting the army juntas who make the most of it to additional develop their new alliance. On February 15, 2024, ministers from the three army juntas met in Ouagadougou to design the institutional and authorized structure of a doable confederation to be shaped from the AES to attain broader integration23.
The AES is a just lately created alliance that should regularly develop in type and content material, as established in articles 3 and 15 of its founding constitution.24 It’s a venture for the longer term that must be complemented by extra texts and to ascertain the mandatory our bodies and mechanisms for its operation in an effort to increase and lengthen its frontiers25 in West Africa. Nonetheless, within the present context, this uncertainty and lack of growth make it a weak alliance.
In brief, the members of the Alliance of Sahel States are in a means of transition and restructuring of alliances in an try and distance themselves from Western affect. The very creation of the AES and the casual announcement of their want to depart ECOWAS have been the primary steps, however the subsequent ones don’t appear to be clear but.
Within the meantime, the AU has ignored what is going on on this a part of the continent. MISAHEL, the mission of this group within the Sahel has been with no chief since August 202326, and the targets, functions and principles27 set out in its Constitutive Act28 appear to have been forgotten.
Thus, within the face of uncertainty, the necessity for exterior help and the disenchantment with Western powers and African organizations, Russia presents itself as a great different for the Liptako-Gourma international locations. A rustic that provides a brand new framework of relations the place political constructions, morals and values will not be imposed.
Russia instead for international help to rising governments
Confrontation with the West is the state of affairs that the Kremlin anticipates for the following six- 12 months interval and that is what the Nationwide Safety Technique of the Russian Federation establishes in its 2021 update29. There are a number of areas wherein Russia seeks to cut back the sphere of affect of Western powers, together with West Africa.
Since 2010, Russia has included the African continent in its international coverage. Throughout these years, it has been positioning itself as a doable different for African states disillusioned with Western alliances, each politically and militarily, by a hybrid technique.
On the one hand, Russia has actively participated by the Wagner Group, carried out disinformation campaigns and led an anti-colonial discourse.
As we are able to see in Determine 5, Wagner is current in Mali and Burkina Faso, amongst different international locations, with lively army operations, taking part in fight, supporting the army juntas in latest coups and controlling mining assets.
Furthermore, following Vladimir Putin’s conflicts with the chief of the mercenary group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and the creation of the AES, this group is being progressively changed by “Afrikanisky Korpus”30 or “African Corps”. A brand new army corps formally representing Russia on the African continent, taking the safety structure established by Wagner underneath a extra centralized command construction within the Russian Ministry of Protection.
Russia is utilizing the “African Corps” to supply “regime survival packages” to army juntas in alternate for entry to pure assets.31 On this means, Russia seeks to increase, get hold of mining concessions and set up parallel companies with which to cowl the prices of its operations and even make a revenue.32 As well as, with its presence, it manages to dislodge Western corporations from an space of strategic significance.
The primary main deployment of this new army corps befell in Burkina Faso in January 2024 with 100 Russian army personnel and, since then, it has been regularly taking management of Mali’s operations33.
When it comes to disinformation campaigns, Russia has relied on the immediacy of social networks to encourage anti-colonialist discourse, revolts towards Western-allied governments, and discontent in society. It has additionally turned to conventional media by increasing the community of the general public media outlet Russia At present (RT), by varied agreements with African media retailers akin to Afrique Media34. These have gone on to disseminate pro-Russian and anti-Western propaganda, emphasizing the decline of the West and presenting Russia as a robust ally that maintains an equal relationship with its companions.
Then again, Russia has used diplomatic channels to extend and enhance relations with African international locations. The summits in Sochi in 2019 and St. Petersburg in 2023 have performed a key function in that course of, strengthening Russian-African relations by political, financial and cultural cooperation. On the final summit, Russia introduced the cancellation of $90 million in debt, the donation of between 25,000 and 50,000 tons of Russian grain and arms contracts with greater than 40 countries35. These measures have been prompted by Russia’s want for worldwide assist within the face of the conflict in Ukraine, which has deteriorated its public picture and diplomatic relations.
Russia has elevated its relations with the AES international locations following the sequence of coups d’état. In November 2023, Kassoum Coulibaly, the Burkinabe protection minister, traveled to Moscow to satisfy together with his counterpart, and in January 2024 the Nigerian prime minister appointed by the army junta, Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine, did so to debate a doable enlargement of relations with Russia in protection, agriculture and energy36. Furthermore, the very creation of the AES befell sooner or later after the protection ministers of Mali and Niger met with the Russian deputy protection minister, Yunus-bek Yevkurov19, demonstrating the shut contact between the governments of the 2 continents.
Threats of Russian presence to the West
This rapprochement of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger with Russia might generate nice tensions with the international locations of the Western bloc. If they start to behave in favor of Russian pursuits, Western international locations could be threatened, particularly the Europeans, however it could even have repercussions for the Individuals, thus making the US and the EU unwilling to cooperate with Russia37.
Uranium mining in Niger and unlawful immigration are two examples that might turn out to be threats to the West.
If Niger grants uranium exploration and exploitation rights to Russia38, this may be perceived by France as a direct assault on French corporations already holding such a license39. This is able to imply elevated competitors and lack of management of the uncooked materials.
Equally, if the AES international locations enable mass unlawful migration by their territory to proceed on the best way to Europe, this may be a serious downside for the Union. At present, the EU receives in its international locations giant waves of unlawful immigration that exceed its capability for coordination and response as a result of lack of a typical migration coverage, producing nice political and social tensions in a number of European international locations.
Conclusions
The creation of the AES, the doable exit of ECOWAS and the rise in relations between Russia and the rising governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger anticipate a geopolitical reconfiguration in Western Africa.
The rise in terrorist exercise, the rising army presence, the neglect by the AU, the lack of energy within the area by the U.S. and European international locations, the emergence of Russia as a brand new different and the uncertainty of the way forward for ECOWAS have led West African international locations to a means of change.
The try by the Liptako-Gourma army juntas to depart ECOWAS is the clearest expression of their international locations’ weariness with the passivity of the regional organizations and their incapacity to reply to the rising insecurity within the space. A departure, which, if it have been to happen, would have drastic penalties for the area’s financial system and safety. Conversely, if the Liptako-Gourma international locations have been to stay in ECOWAS, the mere try or willingness to depart would have been a transparent and robust demonstration of the necessity for larger involvement in an efficient response by the regional grouping and the AU to safety issues.
On the identical time, the creation of the AES is proof of the need for independence, change and new options within the area. If the alliance is maintained, neighboring international locations akin to Guinea and Senegal, which additionally undergo durations of political instability in the meanwhile, might be a part of within the not-too-distant future. Nonetheless, the AES is presently a weak alliance, with a construction to be constructed and a fairly unsure future.
The current scenario in West Africa is unsustainable and requires change. Insecurity has turn out to be the primary issue of regional instability and exterior help remains to be obligatory. The AES states, as has already been demonstrated, lack the mandatory financial and army capabilities. The query is who will present this exterior help? Will the US and France keep their affect within the space or will they be overtaken by Russia?
A fancy query since the way forward for ECOWAS and AES, on the one hand, and the way forward for international help, on the opposite, are intently associated and immediately depending on one another. The reply poses two eventualities.
Within the first state of affairs, if Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso depart ECOWAS and strengthen the AES bloc, international help is prone to come from Russia. Likewise, if Russia exerts larger affect within the area, the departure of those international locations from ECOWAS can be extra probably and the way forward for the AES extra secure.
In a second state of affairs, if Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso stay in ECOWAS and dissolve the AES, the US and EU are prone to stay allies. Likewise, if the Western powers exert larger affect within the space, ECOWAS can be strengthened, stopping the exit of those three international locations, and the AES can be weakened, resulting in its dissolution.
What does appear to be clear is that Russia and the AES type one bloc and ECOWAS and the Western powers type one other. Two incompatible blocs.
Russia defends the army juntas and the Western powers the return to constitutional order. Russia does so by financial and army help, with the African Corps, and the US, the primary Western energy, by assist and funding within the international locations neighboring the AES that keep constitutional order.
In brief, the geopolitical reconfiguration of West Africa is topic to 2 elements, regional organizations or alliances and international help. These two elements in flip decide the 2 blocs that can situation the way forward for the Liptako-Gourma international locations. In the interim, it’s tough to foretell which bloc will dominate.
Alejandro López Martínez* Worldwide Relations and International Communication Scholar
at Universidad Pontificia Comillas
References:
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Revised Treaty of the Financial Group of West African Nations (ECOWAS), ECOWAS Fee. 24/7/1993. https://ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Revised-treaty-1.pdf (consultado 1/2/2024).
23 «Burkina, Mali, Niger: les ministres de l’AES réunis à Ouagadougou en vue de créer une confédération», Radio France internationale. 15/2/2024. https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240215-burkina-mali-niger-les-ministres-en-l-aes- réunis-à-ouagadougou-en-vue-de-créer-une-confédération (consultado 16/2/2024).
24 «Charte du Liptako-Gourma instituant l’Alliance des États du Sahel entre le Burkina Faso, la République du Mali, la République du Niger», Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, de la Coopération Regionale et des Burkinabè de l’Extérieur. 18/9/2023. https://www.mae.gov.bf/element?tx_news_pi1percent5Bactionpercent5D=element&tx_news_pi1percent5Bcontrollerpercent5D=Information&tx_news_ pi1percent5Bnewspercent5D=897&cHash=8d3d29ada5cf8deec05c453414017c17 (consultado 20/2/2024).
25 De acuerdo con el artwork. 11 de la Carta de Liptako-Gourma, la Alianza está abierta a cualquier otro Estado que comparta las mismas realidades geográficas, políticas, socioculturales y que acepte los objetivos de la AES.
26 «Eight Priorities for the African Union in 2024», Worldwide Disaster Group. 14/2/2024. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/african-union-regional-bodies/b195-eight-priorities-african-union- 2024?utm_campaign=dosier-viernes-16-de-febrero-de-2023&utm_medium=electronic mail&utm_source=acumbamail (consultado 15/2/2024).
27 Entre dichos objetivos, propósitos y principios resaltan: promover la unidad y la solidaridad de los Estados africanos, coordinar e intensificar su cooperación y esfuerzos para lograr una vida mejor para los pueblos de África, promover la cooperación internacional, establecer una política de defensa común para el continente africano, o el respeto de los principios democráticos, los derechos humanos, el Estado de derecho y la buena gobernanza.
28 Constitutive Act of the African Union, 11/7/2000. https://au.int/websites/default/information/pages/34873-file- constitutiveact_en.pdf (consultado 10/2/2024).
29 LABORIE, Mario. «La Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional de la Federación Rusa (julio 2021): un manifiesto hacia la confrontación con Occidente», International Technique. 9/9/2021. https://global-strategy.org/la-estrategia-de-seguridad- nacional-de-la-federacion-rusa-julio-2021-un-manifiesto-hacia-la-confrontacion-con-occidente/#_edn1 (consultado 18/12/2023).
30 «Las relaciones de Burkina Faso y Rusia entran en una nueva etapa», OSINT Sahel. 26/1/2024. https://www.osintsahel.com/2024/01/26/las-relaciones-de-burkina-faso-y-rusia-entran-en-una-nueva-etapa/ (consultado 28/1/2024).
31 INWOOD Joe and TACCHI Jake. «Wagner in Africa: How the Russian mercenary group has rebranded», BBC Information. 20/2/2024. https://www.bbc.com/information/world-africa-68322230?utm_campaign=dosier-martes-20-de-febrero- de-2024&utm_medium=electronic mail&utm_source=acumbamail (consultado 2/3/2024).
32 De acuerdo con el «Blood Gold Report» (https://bloodgoldreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/The-Blood- Gold-Report-2023-December.pdf) en los dos últimos años, Rusia ha extraído oro de África por valor de 2.500 millones de dólares que probablemente han contribuido a financiar su guerra en Ucrania.
33 LÓPEZ MIRALLES, Iván. «Rusia avanza en África: Las African Corps desembarcan en Burkina Faso», The Political Room. 16/2/2024. https://thepoliticalroom.com/weblog/rusia-avanza-en-africa-las-african-corps-desembarcan- en-burkina-faso?utm_campaign=dosier-viernes-16-de-febrero-de- 2023&utm_medium=electronic mail&utm_source=acumbamail (consultado 17/2/2024).
34 «African and Russian Media Unite!», Afrique Media. 15/2/2023. https://afriquemedia.television/2023/02/15/african-and- russian-media-unite/ (consultado 17/12/2023).
35 MUÑOZ PANDIELLA, Lluís. «Rusia trata de seducir a África: Putin asegura que estudia plan de paz sobre Ucrania», France 24. 28/7/2023. https://www.france24.com/es/europa/20230728-rusia-trata-de-seducir-a-áfrica-putin- asegura-que-estudia-plan-de-paz-sobre-ucrania (consultado 20/12/2023).
36 FAULCONBRIDGE, Man. «Niger’s junta-appointed PM in Russia for talks», Reuters. 16/1/2024. https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/nigers-junta-appointed-pm-in-russia-for-talks?utm_campaign=dosier-africa- miercoles-17-de-enero-de-2024&utm_medium=electronic mail&utm_source=acumbamail (consultado 20/1/2024).
37 Josep Borrell, vicepresidente de la Comisión Europea y alto representante de la Unión para Asuntos Exteriores y Política de Seguridad ha asegurado que la UE no colaborará con el nuevo cuerpo militar ruso, «African Corps».
Aunque la UE todavía tiene una misión de entrenamiento conocida como EUTM (European Union Coaching Mission) Mali y una misión civil de gestión de disaster, EUCAP Sahel (European Union Capability Constructing Mission) en Mali y Níger, estas podrían llegar a su fin si el acercamiento de estos países a Rusia continúa.
[«EU’s Top Diplomat Says Russian Influence Causing Dilemma in Sahel», Reuters. 31/1/2024. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-01-31/eus-top-diplomat-says-russian-influence-causing-dilemma- in-sahel?utm_campaign=dosier-viernes-2-de-febrero-de-2024&utm_medium=email&utm_source=acumbamail (consultado 4/2/2024)].
38 En documentos del Gobierno ruso se han visto plasmadas proposiciones para presionar a Níger y que este corte a Francia los suministros de uranio29. Elemento químico del que el sector energético francés tiene gran dependencia. 39 PÉREZ, Rafael. «Francia responderá “de inmediato y con decisión” en caso de ataque contra sus intereses en Níger», France 24. 30/0/2023. https://www.france24.com/es/áfrica/20230730-francia-responderá-de-inmediato-y-con- decisión-en-caso-de-ataque-contra-sus-intereses-en-níger (consultado 10/2/2024).
